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Abstract: Reforms to the civil list in the late 18th century in England 
sought to deny the Crown opportunities to use its civil-list funds and 
sinecures to buy influence in Parliament and, thereby, diminish con-
stitutional protections for liberty. Among the most important reforms 
were tighter accounting requirements for civil-list spending, includ-
ing that for the secret services. The unique nature and purpose of the 
home and foreign secret services, which were the responsibility of 
the Crown and paid from civil-service funds, resulted in accounting 
controls which depended upon additional measures to provide Parlia-
ment with greater control over spending and enhanced accountability. 
These enhancements to accountability were especially important at 
a time of almost continual war between England and France in the 
decades spanning the close of the 18th century, resulting in significant 
increases in spending on the foreign secret service.
INTRODUCTION
The history of English public-sector accounting from the 
“Glorious Revolution” in 1688 has been dominated by the need 
to ensure the financial authority of Parliament. In the late 18th 
century, during a remarkable period of public-sector reform, 
the constitutional intent of making the executive financially 
 accountable to Parliament for the expenditure of monies ap-
propriated by Parliament was confirmed as the essential, undi-
minished reason for the unprecedented reforms to government 
accounting associated with the civil list. Binney [1958, p. v] 
has referred to the last two decades of the late 18th century as 
a period of “unique interest and importance” in the history of 
British public finance for this period “witnessed the first draw-
ing back of the curtain concealing from parliamentary and 
public view the design and action of the financial machine.” 
The American War of Independence (1776-1783) and the almost 
continuous war with France from 1792 until 1815 were particu-
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larly important in prompting reform of civil-list accounting and 
audit reforms which provided the basis for subsequent enduring 
reforms in the 19th century. 
Until the financial crisis created by the American War of 
Independence, Parliament took little interest in the civil admin-
istration of the “King’s Executive,” most notably accounts of 
expenditure from the civil list, which provided for the financial 
needs of the monarch, both personal and those of his executive 
government [Chester, 1981, p. 34]. Unlike the civil list, parlia-
mentary control over military spending through a stricter ac-
counting and appropriation regime had been among the most 
important constitutional outcomes of the Glorious Revolution. 
The War of Independence exposed for the first time since then 
the extent to which the Crown used the civil list as a potent form 
of patronage and, thereby, allowed the Crown to threaten liberty 
by extending its influence in the House of Commons. 
In a recent paper, Funnell [2008] has examined the process 
by which widespread apprehension caused by the increasing ar-
rogance of the Crown confirmed the belief at the end of the 18th 
century that there was an intimate dependency between a rigor-
ous, parliamentary-controlled accounting for executive spending 
on the civil list and the preservation of liberties fundamental to 
the English Constitution. Although Funnell’s study provides a 
detailed rendition of the motives for the civil-list reforms and 
the accounting consequences of the reforms for most forms of 
civil-list spending, absent is any mention of the secret services, 
the peculiar purpose of which might have been expected to have 
very different accountability requirements. The main aim of 
the present paper is to meet this omission by highlighting the 
changes to accounting for secret-service funding during the time 
that William Pitt1 was prime minister (1783-1801, 1804-1806) 
which were coincident with the comprehensive reform of the 
civil list that began in the early 1780s and with later ongoing 
hostilities with France. In particular, this paper is concerned 
with a curious, yet understandable, paradox at the time in 
Parliament’s position on accounting for secret-service monies 
when compared with the improved accounting for other civil-list 
spending, resulting in a less rigorous regime of formal account-
ing controls and a greater reliance on professions of honesty. 
1 In this paper, “William Pitt” signifies the British prime minister often re-
ferred to as William Pitt the Younger to distinguish him from his father, William 
Pitt the Elder, also a prominent politician in the 18th century, later known by his 
title as the Earl of Chatham when elevated to the peerage. 
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The overriding need to shield from overt public scrutiny those 
who protected the nation’s interests by engaging in clandestine 
activities, sometimes at the risk of their lives, meant that Parlia-
ment was prepared to treat the secret services as a special case, 
which might permit a very different set of accountability con-
trols and acceptable behaviors. However apposite Parliament’s 
position may have been at the time, rarely has this been without 
its critics. Namier [1963, p. 176], for one, referred to how:
Legends naturally surround all ‘secret service’; its very 
name inspires fear and distrust and stimulates men’s 
imagination – it is believed to be wise and wicked, ef-
ficient and powerful. In reality the most common char-
acteristic of political secret service at all times is its stu-
pidity and the unconscionable waste of money which it 
entails. Where its task is to obtain ‘intelligence,’ it most 
frequently produces tales which could not stand five 
minutes’ cross-examination in a law court.
The present article, which deals with an exceptional period 
in the history of public-sector accounting and accountability 
at the end of the 18th century, is the first in the accounting his-
tory literature to examine the tensions between the peculiar and 
required mode of operation of secret services and the need to 
ensure accountability and transparency for the monies required 
of these services. The growing body of public-sector accounting 
history has been overwhelmingly concerned with accounting 
methods used in central government and audit, notably in times 
of war [for example, see Funnell, 1994; Black, 2001; Edwards et 
al., 2002]. The great freedom allowed the Crown in the spending 
of secret-service funds from the civil list and the absence of an 
effective means to ensure that spending on the domestic and 
foreign secret services would be controlled in total and account-
ed for systematically was a major concern of the promoters of 
the reform of the civil list in the late 18th century. Any spending 
by the Crown allowed to go unchecked represented a potential 
threat to liberty, none more than spending on secret services. 
Indeed, a prominent part of the Civil Establishments Act 1782 
[22 Geo. III, c. 822], the centerpiece of the achievements of the 
economic reform movement championed by Edmund Burke 
2 “An act for enabling his Majesty to discharge the debt contracted upon his 
civil list revenues; and for preventing the same from being in arrear for the future, 
by regulating the mode of payments out of the said revenues, and by suppress-
ing or regulating certain offices herein mentioned, which are now paid out of the 
revenues of the civil list.”
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and the basis of subsequent government accounting reforms 
[see Funnell, 2008], was devoted to innovations that limited total 
spending for some parts of secret-service spending and tightened 
the means by which those directly spending the funds would be 
made accountable. Particularly notable as a form of accounting 
control was the statutory reliance upon the swearing of oaths. 
In the absence of accounts supported by documentary evidence, 
these oaths fulfilled a highly effective, supplementary role in 
the accounting process. While oaths were certainly not a new 
feature of government, or indeed of the administration of law, 
Parliament’s reliance upon them in the context of accounting for 
secret-service spending recognized especially both the necessary 
imperfections of the secret-service accounts and the religious 
imperative in accountability relationships at the time.
In the first section that follows, a brief outline is provided of 
the evolution of modern secret diplomacy and the importance 
of the English secret service in the late 18th century, a time of 
considerable international instability and threat for England. 
The civil-list reforms in the late 18th century are then examined 
to identify the very different approach that was implemented 
for reforming the control of, and accounting for, secret-service 
spending. Most of the details of secret-service spending in the 
18th century that survive, and upon which this research relies, 
are to be found preserved at the British National Archive, Kew, 
in Home Office (H.O.) accounts, Foreign Office (F.O.) accounts, 
Treasury (T) documents, and those from the Audit Office (A.O.). 
THE ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATION OF  
THE ENGLISH SECRET SERVICE
The English secret service in the late 18th century was the 
product of a long period of evolution that owed much to the 
practices of other countries, in particular Italy. From the Italian 
city states during the Renaissance arose the features of intel-
ligence gathering that were to define the modern intelligence 
services throughout Europe. Although the need for information 
about one’s enemies or potential enemies had always been im-
portant in any military success as far back as ancient times, not 
until the 14th and 15th centuries did this intelligence gathering 
reach a sophisticated and truly effective form in the Italian city 
states of Venice and Genoa, a form that was quickly mimicked 
by most other major European states [Thompson and Padover, 
1963]. The Venetians had realized that the best way to create 
and maintain the means to gather reliable information was to 
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establish permanent embassies in neighboring states [Thomp-
son and Padover, 1963, p. 17]. Not until the 16th century did 
England under Henry VIII (1509-1547) follow the Italian exam-
ple and establish permanent embassies in the major European 
states [Bleiweis, 1976, pp. 2-3]. 
Most historians trace the origins of the modern English 
secret service to the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603) and her 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Francis Walsingham 
(1534-1590). In 1573, Walsingham was appointed to the power-
ful Privy Council and in this capacity, notes Haynes [1994, p. 
25], contributed “mightily” to the foreign affairs of England. 
Walsingham took office in the late 16th century at a time when 
the major European states were seeking to expand their influ-
ence and territory and, therefore, were prone to conflict. The 
17th century inherited this instability and became a century of 
almost continual wars, commercial and political. 
In response to the considerable international pressures 
during Elizabeth’s reign, Walsingham created, for the times, 
a formidable intelligence network, with intelligence gathered 
mainly from sources in Holland, France, and Germany. Plowden 
[1991, p. 55] believes that so sophisticated and comprehensive 
was Walsingham’s intelligence-gathering network that it is “no 
exaggeration to say that very little went on in Catholic circles … 
during the 1570s and 1580s” that did not come to Walsingham’s 
notice. Ambassadors were for Walsingham the most important 
official source of information, providing reports of court gossip, 
major political events, and official meetings [Bleiweis, 1976, p. 
39]. Unofficial sources were the largest, most diverse but least 
reliable group of “intelligencers,” which included English liv-
ing abroad, soldiers, sailors, businessmen, artists, and students 
[Bleiweis, 1976, pp. 16-18; Haynes, 1994, p. 12]. One 17th cen-
tury contemporary [quoted in Thompson and Padover, 1963, 
p. 60] wrote that diplomats should nurture their spies because 
“Well-chosen spies contribute more than any other agency to the 
success of great plans … And there is no expense better designed 
… than that which is laid out upon a secret service, it would be 
inexcusable for a minister of state to neglect it.”
Despite the historical importance of intelligence gathering 
for state security, not until 1582 did Elizabeth’s “spy master” 
Walsingham have a regular budget. Initially it was set at £750, 
rising to £2,000 in 1588. Still, this was never sufficient for Wal-
singham to meet the need for regular, reliable foreign intelligence 
from mainly Catholic France. Despite his frequent supplications 
for more money, he often had to use his own money to keep his 
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intelligence operations functioning, eventually bankrupting him 
and his family [Plowden, 1991, p. 55; Haynes, 1994, p. 12]. 
Intelligence gathering was later raised to even more so-
phisticated levels under John Thurloe who became Secretary 
of State in 1652 during the dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell. 
Thurloe was convinced that the best agents were those who 
were motivated by money and that the essential requirement of 
an effective intelligence service was “a good purse” [Thompson 
and Padover, 1963, p. 92]. As a dictatorship surrounded by nu-
merous domestic and foreign enemies, often working together, 
an efficient intelligence-gathering system was essential to the 
maintenance of Cromwell’s authority. Thus, Cromwell spent on 
average more than £70,000 a year to garner both domestic and 
foreign intelligence, none of which he formally accounted for. So 
effective were his secret services that Samuel Pepys concluded 
that “Cromwell carried the secrets of all the princes of Europe 
at his girdle” [quoted in Thompson and Padover, 1963, p. 83]. 
Although England was almost continually in a state of prepara-
tion for war in the century that followed the dictatorship and the 
restoration of the monarchy, not until the wars with France did 
England under William Pitt the Younger again fully appreciate 
the benefits of an effective secret service.
As effective and comprehensive as Cromwell’s secret ser-
vices were, the spending on them while Pitt was prime minister 
represented a very different scale of operation and sophistica-
tion. From almost the outbreak of revolution in France in 1789 
until the end of hostilities in 1815, England was either at war 
with France or believed that it needed to be ready for war. In 
addition, when Pitt became prime minister, England had only 
recently lost the American colonies, its hold over India was 
being threatened by widespread administrative abuses, and 
rebellion had been growing in Ireland. When war with France 
did break out in April 1792, Britain quickly established an ex-
tensive, well-funded espionage center in neutral Switzerland to 
coordinate the collection of intelligence under the direction of 
William Wickham. France, Pitt warned England, had directed its 
hostilities “against the very essence of your liberty, against the 
foundation of your independence … against your constitution 
itself” [House of Commons, November 10, 1797, in Pitt, 1806, p. 
172]. So successful was intelligence gathering in the time of Pitt, 
that it is sometimes credited with a critical role in expanding 
and consolidating the British Empire [Thompson and Padover, 
1963, p. 158]. Table 1 below shows that between 1785 and 1792, 
spending on all parts of the secret service increased signifi-
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cantly when England joined with her European allies against the 
French. Annual outlays for the secret service in these years aver-
aged £24,000 [Mitchell, 1965, p. 256]. There was a particularly 
significant rise in foreign-service spending after 1794 as war 
began to envelop Europe. 
TABLE 1
Charges Incurred and Paid for Secret Service Money,  
1775-1798
Year
Sums issued to 
the Secretaries 
of State (mainly 
for foreign-secret 
service)
Sums issued to 
Treasury (mainly 
for home-secret 
service)
Sums issued to 
Post Office (for 
home-secret 
service)
Total
£ £ £ £
1775 11,250 34,000 7,249 52,499
1776 9,000 39,000 6,263 54,263
1777 9,000 57,000 7,139 73,139
1778 9,000 51,000 7,159 67,159
1779 7,250 62,000 7,239 76,489
1780 8,362 37,000 7,139 52,501
1781 6,750 40,000 7,875 54,625
1782 15,225 31,000 3,569 49,794
1783 35,500 8,000 0 43,500
1784 7,006 3,000 0 10,006
1785 31,878 6,000 0 37,878
1786 25,727 96,000 0 121,727
1787 98,050 10,000 0 108,050
1788 212,851 10,000 0 222,851
1789 32,154 10,000 0 42,154
1790 26,221 10,000 0 36,221
1791 22,244 10,000 0 32,244
1792 14,992 10,000 0 24,992
1793 39,585 10,000 0 49,585
1794 49,335 10,000 0 59,335
1795 173,068 10,000 0 183,068
1796 183,194 10,000 0 193,194
1797 223,222 10,000 0 233,222
1798 175,000 10,000 0 185,000
Source: “An Account of the Charges Incurred and Paid for Secret Service Money, 
1774-1798,” House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century, Vol. 
121, July 4, 1799.
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 Apart from the continued reliance upon traditional sources 
of information, the Post Office in the 18th century, as Table 1 
demonstrates, was an especially effective means of collecting 
information about domestic and foreign matters until the 1780s, 
when the funding arrangements for secret services changed dra-
matically. The importance of the Post Office as a source of intel-
ligence, both domestic and foreign, was established in 1710 with 
the passage of An Act for establishing a General Post Office for all 
her Majesty’s Dominions [12 Anne c. 10]. The act gave the Post 
Office a monopoly over all movement of mail. There was to be 
only “one General Letter Office and Post Office … erected within 
the City of London, from whence all Letters and Packets … may 
be sent into any Part of the Kingdom … or to North America, 
the West Indies, or to any other of her Majesty’s Dominions …” 
[12 Anne c. 10, Section II]; control was to be absolute. These 
exclusive rights gave the Post Office the ability to monitor al-
most all the mail entering, leaving, and moving around England. 
The act also allowed the Principal Secretaries of State, and only 
them, to delay and open any mail [12 Anne c. 10, Section XL]. 
Irrespective of the source of information, Namier [1963, p. 176] 
regarded all secret-service spending in the early modern period 
as a waste of money. With the primary function of the secret ser-
vice to buy corruption, it was to be expected that it would only 
be successful in purchasing the services of individuals whose 
services were unlikely to be worthwhile. Secret-service spending 
created a “mutual benefit society for pseudo-political parasites” 
with a financial interest in fomenting fear and exaggeration 
[Namier, 1963, p. 176].
The unique nature of the secret service and its growing im-
portance, cost, and sophistication in the 18th century were rec-
ognized when it came time in the closing decades to reform the 
civil list and accounting for civil-list expenditures, with several 
main sections of the Civil Establishments Act concerned exclu-
sively with the secret services. 
REFORM OF THE CIVIL LIST AND THE SECRET SERVICES
Throughout the 18th century, the relationship between 
Parliament and the executive was one of an overdeveloped de-
sire to ensure a separation of their respective powers. Only by 
“destroying the equilibrium of power between one branch of the 
legislature and the rest” would the constitution be threatened 
[Bentham, 1776, p. 73]. Parliament did not want to know how 
the King spent his money from the civil list on the royal house-
8
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hold or on the civil government; Parliament only wanted to be 
certain that limits were placed on the level of civil-list spending 
[Funnell, 2008]. It was the King’s government and it was ac-
cepted as the King’s constitutional right to govern as he saw fit 
[Chubb, 1952, p. 9; Blackstone in Roseveare, 1969, p. 87]. The 
civil-list funds were therefore accepted as a means of reducing 
any constitutional friction between the Crown and Parliament 
[Cromwell, 1968, p. 5]. The high ideals of the constitution, how-
ever, did not prevent the Crown from regularly attempting to 
influence Parliament through the use of honors and sinecures 
associated with the civil list, which Castlereagh observed were 
“more likely than any others to secure parliamentary influence” 
[quoted in Foord, 1947, p. 499]. 
The cost of the royal household and of departments of state 
was to be met primarily from the Crown’s hereditary sources of 
income. In addition, Parliament granted monarchs additional 
funding at the beginning of their reigns, which constituted the 
civil-list funds. The intention of Parliament was to ensure that 
the Crown had sufficient income to meet all its needs, both the 
personal needs of the sovereign and for carrying out executive 
functions. In return, the Crown was expected to live within its 
income, except during periods of emergency such as wars. The 
reality was somewhat different. Even in the absence of war, 
Parliament was frequently called upon to vote amounts to cover 
large accumulated deficits in the royal budget. However, it was 
war, and the Crown’s indebtedness that war inevitably produced, 
which provided Parliament with unchallengeable opportunities 
to examine the financial affairs of the Crown when additional 
funding from Parliament was sought, none more so in the 18th 
century than the American War of Independence [see Funnell, 
2008]. 
The American War of Independence was a watershed in not 
only refashioning England’s standing as an imperial power but 
also in the changes that it produced in government finances. The 
mounting cost of the war and the Crown’s growing indebtedness 
and influence in Parliament soon raised concerns about the way 
in which the war was being managed, about whether the money 
taken from a small and wealthy elite was being used effectively 
and appropriately. From this spreading discontent arose the 
economical reform movement, popularized by Edmund Burke’s 
speech in the House of Commons on February 11, 1780 [Parlia-
mentary History, XXI, cols. 1-73]. Earlier Burke [Parliamentary 
History XX, December 7, 1779, col. 1,257] had criticized spend-
ing on the war and for domestic purposes as: 
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Lavish and wasteful to a shameful degree. Oeconomy, 
the most rigid and exact oeconomy, has become abso-
lutely necessary … Amidst the many and various mat-
ters that require reformation … before this country can 
rise superior to its powerful enemies; the waste of pub-
lic treasure requires instant remedy … 
While financial concerns most immediately and directly 
created the economical reform movement, these were also 
symptomatic of a more fundamental and far more serious 
worry. The vast sums involved in the war against the American 
colonies allowed the Crown to purchase greater influence in 
Parliament with the granting of profitable, war-related contracts 
and sinecures [Watson, 1960, pp. 232, 247]. According to one 
member of the House of Commons, in no other period of history 
did contracting abuses “flourish in such rank extravagance. At 
no other period were they so detrimental to the public service” 
(observations made in the House of Commons, as quoted in 
[Porritt, 1963, p. 218]). A leader of the economical reform move-
ment, Christopher Wyvill, warned that the war had resulted in 
“the national substance … fast waning away by the profusion 
of expence in this rash and unfortunate war; and the influence 
of the Crown fed by that very prodigality, and increased in full 
proportion to it, is now swollen to a most alarming magnitude” 
[quoted in Harling, 1996, p. 34]. 
Allowing the Crown to buy influence by the granting of 
sinecures undermined the independence of both public officials 
and weakened the constitution [see Burke in Cromwell, 1968, 
p. 6]. The Crown’s influence during the War of Independence, 
observed the pre-eminent constitutional authority William 
Blackstone, had become “most amazingly extensive” [Black-
stone quoted in Foord, 1947, p. 484; Funnell, 2008]. Charles Fox 
referred to this influence of the Crown as the “one grand domes-
tic evil, from which all our other evils, foreign and domestic, 
have sprung. … To the influence of the Crown we must attribute 
the loss of the … thirteen provinces of America …” [quoted in 
Ayling, 1972, p. 287]. Dunning’s resolution in the Commons that 
“the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and 
ought to be diminished” [Parliamentary History XXI, April 6, 
1780, cols. 340-388; Watson, 1960, p. 232; Ayling, 1972, p. 283] 
helped to precipitate the beginning of the end of the more outra-
geous abuses of royal patronage. Deficiencies in accounting for 
civil-list expenditures, including for the secret services, and the 
threat that this posed to liberty also prompted Dunning [Parlia-
mentary History XXI, April 6, 1780, col. 367, also col. 691; see 
10
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also Foord, 1947, p. 491] to call upon the House:
To examine into and to correct abuses in the expendi-
ture of the civil list revenue. … If the public money was 
faithfully applied and frugally expended, that would re-
duce the influence of the Crown; if, on the other hand, 
the influence of the Crown was restrained within its 
natural and constitutional limits, it would at once more 
restore that power which the constitution had rested in 
that house – the inquiring into and controlling the ex-
penditure of public money … 
Enactment of the remarkably innovative Civil Establish-
ments Act [22 Geo. III, c. 82] in 1782, which owed its existence 
to the commitment, political standing, and brilliance of Edmund 
Burke, provided for the elimination of many sinecures which 
had been used to enhance the Crown’s influence in Parliament 
[see Funnell, 2008]. It also established a more formal regime of 
accounting for civil-list funds, thereby enhancing Parliament’s 
financial authority over the executive. More immediately, it in-
troduced a number of iconoclastic reforms to control the level of 
spending on the secret services and to enhance significantly par-
liamentary surveillance through improved accounting require-
ments centered on the Treasury. 
The highly influential Lord Shelburne believed at the time 
that publicity through better accounting was the only sure way 
to avoid the abuses that now plagued the executive and the civil 
list. He sought to ensure that all matters that involved expendi-
ture should be open to public view, although, significantly, not 
those pertaining to the secret services [Binney, 1958, p. 268]. Ac-
counting for the secret services had always been haphazard and 
at the discretion of the Crown. When upon leaving the Treasury 
in 1766, Lord Rockingham asked how to close the secret-service 
accounts, he was informed by the Duke of Newcastle, one of 
his predecessors, that when he had provided the secret-service 
accounts to George II, “the late King used to burn them in the 
presence of the person who was concerned” [quoted in Namier, 
1963, p. 173]. Only rarely when the Crown sought additional 
funds to meet mounting deficits would Parliament be able to 
see something of what had been spent on the secret services and 
how it had been spent. Accordingly, the secrecy that normally 
surrounded the civil list was to be found in an exaggerated form 
with the accounts for the secret services, which allowed the 
Crown great discretion in the use of money for secret service or 
other purposes, including corrupting Parliament. Use of secret-
service funds to buy influence in Parliament had a long his-
11
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tory, especially at election time. In one election, cited by Namier 
[1963, p. 203], the not inconsiderable sum of £1,000 was paid 
out of the secret-services money of the civil list to the Duke of 
Argyll and additional monies paid to another 24 candidates. In 
addition, between elections, considerable sums were spent out 
of the secret-service funds to assist the government in gaining 
influence in boroughs.
ACCOUNTING FOR SECRET-SERVICE SPENDING  
AND THE 1782 ACT
Spending Limits: The Civil Establishments Act has been de-
scribed by Reitan [1966, p. 335] as the act that finally ended 
the struggle over the nation’s finances between Parliament and 
the executive. Pitt was later to remind Parliament that it should 
never take for granted its financial authority for “the general 
principle which constituted the chief security of our liberties 
… [was still] the power of controlling the public expenditure” 
[House of Commons, December 8, 1796, in Pitt, 1806]. The 
overriding intentions of the act to give greater publicity to the 
financial affairs of the executive and to control spending on the 
civil list were clearly established in the preamble with the need 
for “introducing a better Order and Oeconomy in the Civil List 
Establishments, and for the better Security of the Liberty and 
Independency of Parliament.” 
Until Burke’s reforms, there was no protocol for determin-
ing the amounts to be spent on the secret services, which were 
organized according to domestic or foreign activities. This 
changed notably in the case of the home secret-service spending 
when, in response to repeated abuses and the absence of reliable 
accounts which permitted these abuses, Burke was able to in-
troduce statutory limits to spending. The 1782 act required “for 
preventing … all Abuses in the Disposal of Monies issued under 
the Head of Secret Service Money” for monies spent “within 
this Kingdom,” that the home secret service, was not to exceed 
£10,000 in any one year [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXIV]. At the 
same time, in an effort to tighten control over the issue of secret-
service monies, the new act no longer allowed the Post Office to 
be a conduit for these monies. This is clearly seen in Table 1 
above where, after 1782, all secret-service funding for the Post 
Office ceased. The Post Office would still remain a very effective 
means of collecting intelligence throughout England and in ob-
taining intelligence by intercepting communications to and from 
foreign representatives in England. 
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Burke made it clear that he did not want to threaten the 
effectiveness of the home secret service but, consistent with the 
main purpose of the act, he did want to limit the total spend-
ing in any one year and deny the Crown any discretion in the 
amounts to be spent. Should the total spent on the home secret 
service need to increase beyond the amount now set by legis-
lation, this would now have to be considered by Parliament 
since any increase in spending required an amendment to the 
controlling legislation. Thus, the total spent on the home secret 
service was to be limited, indeed fixed, and better controlled by 
Parliament. Although it served an important role during periods 
of major social unrest, of which the 1790s are notable, the home 
secret service under Pitt, as before, never assumed any great 
importance. Indeed, there are very few references to agents in 
its employ in extant ministerial papers and other official docu-
ments from the late 18th century. Rarely did its agents work 
full-time in gathering information [Ehrman, 1983, p. 137]. Ac-
cordingly, spending on the home secret service was insignificant 
when compared to that which had for some time been spent on 
the foreign secret service. Spending on the foreign secret ser-
vice, often in states which were potentially and actively enemies 
of England, was also far more difficult to control with certainty, 
especially in times when war threatened to erupt at anytime. 
Where it was not possible easily to limit the level of spend-
ing “by reason of the uncertain quantity of the service,” such 
as in a time of war, Burke’s Act required that any spending for 
the service be confined “to its line”; that is, all spending for the 
service must be accounted for in the one type of appropriation 
and not distributed between votes or types of appropriations 
which would provide the Crown with the opportunity to hide 
spending and to deceive Parliament. He sought to reassure 
Parliament that he did not seek “to stop the progress of expense 
in its line, but to confine it to that line in which it professes to 
move” [Parliamentary History, February 14, 1780]. This had the 
great advantage of allowing Parliament to be certain that, while 
the level of spending may not be within its full control, the ap-
propriation accounts would guarantee that it was aware of the 
extent to which spending had occurred. For this to be effective, 
a more prominent role for the Treasury was required.
The Accounting Role of the Treasury and the Secretary of State: To 
enhance further the control of all secret-service spending and 
accounting, from 1783 on, all secret-service monies would be 
issued only through the Treasury, to whom the person receiving 
13
Funnell: On His Majesty's Secret Service: Accounting for the Secret Service in a time of national peril 1782-1806;
Published by eGrove, 2010
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201042
the monies would be accountable and from whom he would 
receive his discharge. No longer would secret-service monies be 
paid out of civil-service monies without the express permission 
of the Commissioners of the Treasury [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section 
XXVIII]. The Treasury was also required to keep detailed ac-
counts of all parts of the civil-service receipts and spending and 
to strike an annual balance for each element [22 Geo. III, c. 82, 
Section XXXV]. At the head of the Treasury were the five Lords 
Commissioners, with the First Lord specifically authorized to 
pay monies out of the fund provided for secret services [Binney, 
1958, p. 170]. In addition to now controlling all accounting and 
audit for civil-service monies, the Treasury was the authorized 
body to commence any legal actions for the recovery of any 
amounts for which a discharge had not been given. 
Complementing the greatly enhanced role of the Treasury 
in accounting, the 1782 act stipulated that the authority to use 
the money appropriated to the foreign secret service was now to 
be restricted to only three senior public officials who, ultimately, 
would be held accountable to Parliament through the Treasury 
for the monies given into their charge. Accordingly, the 1782 
act required that the payment of any monies from the civil-list 
revenues for the foreign secret service was to be only through 
one of the Principle3 Secretaries of State at the Foreign Office 
and the Home Office or the First Commissioner of the Admiralty 
[22 Geo. III. c. 82, Section XXV]. Thus, for example, the follow-
ing information concerning use of civil-service funds for the 
foreign service was still being sent to the Treasury decades later 
in September 1830: “£432/13/- received by Earl of Aberdeen, 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and spent on Foreign 
Secret Service and for which I am accountable under Civil List 
Act of 22 George III c. 82” [A.O. 119/118]. Each of the newly au-
thorized officials would be charged by the Treasury with secret-
service monies and required to submit accounts to the Treasury 
at predetermined intervals to receive their discharge or quietus. 
Consistent with the wider reform of accounting for civil-service 
spending and, in particular, to provide greater transparency 
and accountability for monies given to senior officials, the Civil 
Establishments Act also prohibited the long-standing practice of 
allowing secret-service monies paid to the Principle Secretaries 
of State to be disguised as part of their salary. Thus, in 1769, for 
example, £3,000 was paid to each of the two Principle Secretar-
ies of State, the Secretary for Home Affairs and the Secretary 
3 “Principle” is the correct historical spelling for the period.
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for Foreign Affairs, from secret-service monies as part of their 
salaries [Namier, 1963, p. 192]. After the 1782 act, secret-service 
monies would now be clearly identified as salary, a fee, or an al-
lowance. 
Most of the money provided through the Treasury to the 
three senior approved officials subsequently would be made 
available to English ambassadors and senior officers in the 
armed services who, in turn, would be charged to account for 
this money to one of the Secretaries of State or the First Com-
missioner of the Admiralty. Previous to the 1782 act, secret-
service monies were given to a number of ministers who would 
dispense the money to their informants or officials, mostly am-
bassadors, as they saw fit. For this money, they neither expected 
nor required any receipts or other documentary evidence to 
verify how the money was spent, only that it was received by the 
ambassador and had been spent for the purposes authorized. 
The greatly enhanced role for the Treasury in accounting for 
secret-service monies required by the 1782 act also extended to 
the audit of the accounts. Audit was put on a more permanent 
and regular footing in 1785 with the creation of five Commis-
sioners for Auditing the Public Accounts and their office, the 
Board of Audit4 [25 Geo. III c. 52], which was placed very firmly 
under Treasury control [see 25,Geo. III, c. 52, sections VIII, XI, 
XIV, XVIII, XIX, XXI]. In particular, the Treasury continued to 
be responsible for executing the commissioners’ oath of office 
[s. IV], appointing audit staff, and for determining all conditions 
associated with their employment [s. V]. The 1785 act marked 
“in the strongest manner the intention of the legislature that 
… [the Board] should be strictly subject to the controls of the 
Treasury” [1810 Committee on Public Expenditure, Fifth Report, 
p. 388]. In practice, the 1810 Committee on Public Expenditure 
[Fifth Report, p. 398] found that this meant that: 
the decision of the Auditors is in no instance final; but 
the Lords of the Treasury exercise complete authority 
with regard to all the articles of an Account … [The] 
special jurisdiction of the Treasury is constantly and 
habitually necessary to the final settlement and passing 
4 The first Board of Audit, appointed on July 5, 1785, consisted of, in addition 
to the five commissioners, two of whom were Controllers of Army Accounts, two 
Inspectors General on £500 per.annum, and 16 clerks earning between £80 and 
£300 per annum. By September 1785, an extra seven junior clerks, a solicitor, 
an office keeper and two messengers had been appointed. The office was further 
expanded in 1787 and remained at a total complement of 43 until into the 19th 
century [Establishment Rolls, Board of Audit 1785-1799, National Audit Office].
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of the greater part of the Public Accounts which are ex-
amined by the Commissioners of Audit. 
In another attempt to promote the wise management of in-
dividual civil-list revenues and to ensure that the necessary ser-
vices would be provided without the Crown accumulating debts 
which at regular intervals had required Parliament to grant ad-
ditional funding, the 1782 act placed a limit of £900,000 on the 
civil list. Very controversially, the act also provided for payments 
to be made in a prescribed, unvarying order from the eight 
classes specified for the appropriation of civil-list revenues. The 
latter condition was intended in particular to reduce discretion 
in how secret-service monies were spent. Where discretion by an 
official of the Crown was able to be exercised over the civil-list 
money appropriated by Parliament, Burke sought a new “plan of 
arrangement” to prevent this discretion being abused. In Burke’s 
view, it was not “safe to permit an entirely arbitrary discretion 
even in the First Lord of the Treasury himself; it will not be safe 
to leave with him a power of diverting the public money from 
its proper objects, of paying it in an irregular course…” [Par-
liamentary History, February 14, 1780]. Removing the ability of 
the Crown to choose how to spend secret-service monies would 
enhance the ability of Parliament to make the executive account-
able by establishing in the act “a fixed and invariable order in all 
… payments, which it shall not be permitted to the First Lord 
of the Treasury, upon any pretence whatsoever, to depart from” 
[22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXIV]. Only when the costs of each 
higher-ranked service had been fully provided for could the next 
class of expenditures be paid. 
Not surprisingly, the first priority of payments from the civil 
list was the pensions and allowances of the royal family. This 
was followed in the second class by payments for allowances 
and pensions of senior government and parliamentary officials, 
such as the Speaker of the House of Commons, and judges. 
Payments to England’s ambassadors and foreign consuls, which 
included secret service payments, formed the third class in the 
civil list. Cleverly, to encourage Commissioners of the Treasury 
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to take seriously their 
new responsibilities for the civil list, their salaries and other 
remuneration were provided for in the eighth and final class [22 
Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXXI]. Thus, not until all other demands 
on the civil list had been met, would these officials receive any 
payments. In 1786, with a total of £900,000 now fixed for civil-
service spending and when spending for the first seven classes 
16
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of civil spending totaled £897,000, there was only £3,000 left 
available for the Commissioners of the Treasury. Outcomes such 
as this, notes Watson [1960, p. 248], made it very unlikely that 
corruption and bribery by the Crown would be allowed to occur 
on any appreciable scale and, at the same time, encouraged a 
much more closely policed accounting regime. In addition, the 
act prohibited any amounts unpaid to the Commissioners of the 
Treasury being treated as arrears, providing another powerful 
incentive to watch spending closely [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section 
XXXII; Binney, 1958, p. 271]. Should any amount be unpaid, the 
arrear “shall be wholly lapsed and extinguished, as if the same 
had not been payable” [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXXIII]. Ac-
counts of spending in the order prescribed were to be kept by 
the Treasury and made available to both Houses of Parliament 
when required [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXXV]. 
Oaths and Accounting for a Quietus: While clear lines of account-
ability for secret-service monies were established by the 1782 
act, when it came to accounting for these after funds had left 
the hands of the Secretaries of State and were given to agents 
in the field, a very different set of accounting practices prevailed 
to that required for all other parts of the civil list, thereby rec-
ognizing the peculiar nature of secret-service expenditure. The 
juxtaposition of secrecy and access to large sums of money 
with few formal accountability controls over agents in the field 
of service recognized that accounting for secret-service spend-
ing on the frontline was expected to be very different from that 
of other civil-list spending. Certainly it was unlikely, given the 
nature of the process of gathering information from individuals 
who would wish that their identities remain known only to their 
immediate contacts, that there was the opportunity to obtain 
detailed receipts for expenditures in a similar manner to that of 
other government services. Burke recognized that the fluidity 
and unpredictability of international politics, hence the need for 
intelligence gathering and the need to keep secret the identities 
of those gathering intelligence for England, meant that a very 
different way of exercising accountability and of obtaining ac-
counts was required. 
Ambassadors, consuls, or commissioners representing Eng-
land in another country, or any commander-in-chief or other 
senior commander of the navy or land forces receiving secret-
service monies from the Secretaries of State, would be expected 
to provide receipts for the money received, although these were 
in aggregate only. Unlike the more stringent accounting require-
17
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ments now required for all other civil-list monies, these receipts 
were required to state only that the money had been received 
for the “purpose for which the same hath been issued” [22 Geo. 
III, c. 82, Section XXV]. The Secretaries of State and the First 
Commissioner of the Admiralty would receive their discharge or 
quietus from the Treasury once the necessary receipts had been 
received and given to the Treasury. Crucially, they had to swear 
an oath in person before the Barons of the Treasury, testifying 
to the veracity of the accounts based upon these receipts. These 
receipts from ambassadors and others had to be provided to 
the Exchequer within three years of the money being issued 
to obtain a quietus. The receipts for monies received from the 
Secretaries of State and the First Commissioner of the Admi-
ralty which formed the basis upon which a charge was created 
against officials in foreign postings, were sufficient, once the 
handwriting had been verified, to “acquit and discharge the 
said Secretary or Secretaries, or First Commissioner of the Ad-
miralty, in their said Account at the Exchequer” [22 Geo. III, c. 
82, Section XXV]. The accounts for secret-service monies, with 
receipts for spending, now required to be submitted by Secretar-
ies of State to the Treasury, and thence to the Audit Office, were 
in the form of the traditional charge-and-discharge accounts. In 
Figure 1 below, the account and the oath which accompanies 
it is typical of foreign secret-service accounts provided after 
Burke’s Act in 1782 and after refinements contained in 45 Geo. 
III, c. 76 in 1805.
Should it be necessary for the Secretaries of State or the 
First Commissioner of the Admiralty to use money issued for 
foreign secret service for domestic purposes, an acquittance 
would be granted if they swore the following oath [22 Geo. III, c. 
82, Section XXVII] before the Barons of the Exchequer:
I A.B. do swear, That the Money paid to me for Foreign 
Secret Service, or for Secret Service in detecting, pre-
venting, or defeating, treasonable, or other dangerous 
Conspiracies against the State…, has been bona fide, ap-
plied to the said Purpose or Purposes, and to no other: 
and that it hath not appeared to me convenient to the 
State that the same should be paid Abroad. So help me 
GOD. 
In 1805, soon after the union of Britain and Ireland, a 
similar provision was included in civil-list legislation for secret-
service payments by Commissioners of the Lord High Treasurer 
in Ireland to the Under Secretary for Civil Affairs in the Office 
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of the Chief Secretary. To enhance parliamentary control over 
secret-service payments for rebellious Ireland in “detecting, pre-
venting or defeating treasonable or other dangerous Conspira-
cies against the State,” an acquittance was to be granted for the 
Under Secretary who had been given the secret-service money 
after making an oath very similar to that required of officials in 
England. Unusually, and recognizing the fraught conditions in 
Ireland, receipts or other documentation were not required, only 
that the Under Secretary affirmed by oath before the Barons of 
the Exchequer in Ireland that the money given to him had been 
“bona fide applied to such Purposes” as approved and that the 
spending of the money for these purposes had been approved 
[45 Geo III, c. 76].
For the officials, most often an ambassador, who had paid 
foreign agents, for which documentary evidence would have 
been most unusual, a quietus would be given if within one year 
of arriving back in England, they either returned any money 
FIGURE 1
General Account of the Monies issued and received  
by the Right Honourable Earl Bathurst, late His Majesty’s 
Principle Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, under the 
Head of Secret Service from 1st November 1809 to the 14 
March 1810
Charge Discharge
£ £
By Balance received 
from the Right 
Honourable George 
Canning
397.19.4 Expended by William 
Hamilton as per receipt
24,067.9.3
By Exchequer Issues 
during said period
30,000.0.0 To Foreign Ministers 168.5.8
To pay the fees thereon 768.10.0 Deducted at the 
Treasury and Exchequer 
for Fees
768.10.0
Balance transferred 
to M. Willerby as per 
Receipt
6162.4.5
£31,166.9.4 £31,166.9.4
“The Right Honourable Earl Bathurst, this Accountant maketh oath that the 
above Accounts to the best of his knowledge and belief are true and just” (25 June 
1812).
Source: A.O. 3/949
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received to the Exchequer or made the following oath [also see 
A.O. 19/118] before the Barons of the Exchequer: 
I A.B. do swear, That I have disbursed the Money, in-
structed to me for Foreign Secret Service, faithfully, 
according to the Intent and Purpose for which it was 
given, according to my best Judgment, for his Majesty’s 
Service, So help me GOD. 
No further documentation was required. The discharge was 
given by the Treasury through the Upper Exchequer, or Exche-
quer of Accounts, which had the authority to summon before 
it most officials who performed the role of public accountant; 
that is, the individual held accountable by Parliament for money 
spent by the executive. The Upper Exchequer also recorded the 
details of the accounts of the public accountants. Once the qui-
etus had been given by the Upper Exchequer, this was the final 
authority. No matters could again be raised in relation to the 
accounts and monies nor could they be challenged by the courts 
[Binney, 1958, p. 189]. 
In most cases when no documentation was provided by 
the sources of intelligence who ultimately received the secret-
service monies, whether full-time spies or unofficial agents for 
whom anonymity may have been a matter of life and death, the 
oaths required of accountable officers associated with the secret 
services assumed great importance. The oath in effect at times 
substituted for the documentary evidence which was required 
when accounting for other civil-list spending and mirrored 
oath taking in the courts and elsewhere. The oath that accom-
panied the accounts fulfilled an important auxiliary role in the 
accounting process by providing Parliament and the Treasury 
with an additional assurance that the accounts were a “true 
and just” rendition of how the secret-service money had been 
used. The practice of taking an oath to attest to the veracity of 
accounts and the fidelity of actions was very widespread, to be 
found wherever an account of any significance was to be given. 
Indeed, swearing an oath and relying upon the integrity of the 
authorized officials was an essential accounting control. Thus, 
inspectors of accounts working on behalf of the Board of Audit 
also were required to take an oath [Commissioners for Auditing 
the Public Accounts, 1786]:
...not to permit, suffer, or conceal, any fraud whatsoever 
in any accounts intrusted to your care. In all Accounts...
you shall see that they are carefully and faithfully exam-
ined, drawn, and prepared for Auditing; giving therein 
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to no Accountant any allowance but such as shall be 
duly and regularly vouched and allowable according to 
the custom, method, and rules of the Exchequer. 
The influential Lord Shelburne in the late 18th century 
was far less convinced of the efficacy of oaths as an accounting 
control, preferring instead the rendering of accounts in a public 
 forum, with the one notable exception of secret-service accounts. 
He observed [quoted in Binney, 1958, p.269] that he had:
...found by experience that this is the grand principle of 
economy and the only method of preventing abuses; far 
better than oaths or any other checks which have been 
devised. Instead, therefore, of oaths there should be an 
obligation to print at the end of the year every expendi-
ture and every contract, except in cases of Secret Ser-
vice, which may be subject to checks of another nature.
Unlike the present, an oath had far greater social signifi-
cance in the 18th century. The right to take an oath was both a 
mark of social position and provided a clear indication of the 
legal status of the matter for which the oath was made. Also, as 
much as the legal importance of the oath and its role as an ad-
ministrative device, the ritual of taking an oath impressed upon 
persons the importance of what they were about to do. Most 
obviously taking an oath in court, in a form which has some 
religious significance, when giving evidence has long been the 
means by which courts are able to impress upon those involved 
the importance of their actions and statements; indeed, their 
very life might be in danger for a false declaration [Binney, 1958, 
p. 269]. In the 18th century, a time when everyone was expected 
to have a strong religious belief, the ritual of the taking an oath 
was in effect a solemn appeal to God testifying to one’s truthful-
ness, which symbolized the expectation that any lies would not 
escape unpunished for to swear a false oath was to imperil one’s 
soul. 
CONCLUSION
Given that the overriding concern of the civil-list reforms af-
ter 1782 was to protect the liberties of all Englishmen, any part 
of government which was allowed to continue to operate with a 
high level of secrecy and, thus, was a potentially potent means 
to threaten liberty was especially important. Even though pro-
found accounting and accountability changes were made to the 
civil list after 1782, notably the appointment of commissioners 
for auditing the public accounts, the treatment of secret-service 
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spending in the Civil Establishments Act recognized that these 
reforms had their limits when it came to clandestine operations 
for which the giving of formal accounts for monies spent may 
be incommensurate with the clandestine nature of the services 
performed. The considerable opportunity that this allowed for 
abuse in the spending of secret-service funds did not escape the 
attention of Burke. Thus, the 1782 act contained a number of 
significant clauses which were concerned with the amounts to 
be spent on the secret services and, as a means to ensure that ac-
countable individuals could be clearly identified, the procedure 
by which the money would be spent and accounted for. The pro-
visions of the act that were related to the secret services sought 
to compensate for the unavoidable paucity of secret-service ac-
counts by limiting the authority for secret-service spending to a 
very few senior offices and relying upon their integrity. 
The concerns of this article have been limited to a period 
of time when the beginnings of modern systems of financial 
accountability for governments were established and were be-
ginning to be more fully appreciated. Thus, the article provides 
the opportunity to prompt accounting historians to examine the 
subsequent evolution from the early 19th century of accounting 
for the secret services in Britain and other democratic states, 
although recognizing the obvious significant impediments that 
may be present to gaining access to information. These difficul-
ties in and of themselves would prove the value of attempts to 
investigate whether and how secret services have been made 
accountable, but especially in the most chaotic and extreme 
political circumstances such as war when there is a well-
 demonstrated tendency for governments to become dangerously 
arrogant and the protections that mechanisms of financial ac-
countability have provided for individual citizens are shown to 
be insufficient. The surprising, ongoing silence in the literature 
about the accountability of the secret services contradicts their 
significance in times of war or other national military emergen-
ces, such as the 21st century “war against terror” by the U.S. and 
its allies, but especially the threat that abuses by insufficiently 
accountable secret services can have for the liberty of citizens 
in democratic states. The potency of this threat and the alac-
rity with which governments may be tempted to jeopardize the 
liberty of individuals, either for reasons of political self-interest 
or supposedly in the national interest, have been exposed many 
times throughout the war-ravaged 20th century and now into 
the 21st century. An enhanced understanding of accounting for 
secret services would also complement the work by researchers 
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such as Chwastiak [1999, 2001, 2006] and Gallhofer and Haslam 
[1991], who have exposed the importance of accounting in jus-
tifying war, providing opportunities for the military industrial 
complexes in states such as the U.S. and Britain to gain extrava-
gant financial benefits from war and in excusing the excesses of 
war.
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